PRC Disinformation and U.S. Elections: What to Watch For (Part I) and more

The Presidential race, Congressional contests, what I'm reading, and a prisoner to remember

The Kremlin may be the primary culprit regularly attempting to influence foreign elections, but since 2018 the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has also stepped into the ring, often with a different set of goals, priorities, leverage points, and tactics.

With under three months to go until major U.S. elections, how likely is PRC interference to occur and what forms might it take?

Tilting the balance towards Trump or Harris? Unlikely, but latent tools exist

Since 2017, the CCP has increased the use of online information operations, fake accounts, and disinformation (the deliberate spreading of false and misleading content) to target the United States. But to date this has not taken the form of trying to directly influence the outcome of a presidential race.

The regime’s restraint is partly thanks to the strong bipartisan consensus in Washington on the threat posed by China’s authoritarian government and a relatively high degree of policy continuity on this issue between the Biden and Trump administrations.

This trend seems set to continue for the 2024 race.

Nevertheless, should the political winds shift, and Beijing’s political calculations change, the latent tools and experience to target a U.S. presidential or Vice-Presidential candidate certainly exist. A close look at January 2024 elections in Taiwan and a recent incident in the Philippines highlight the regime’s capacity to try and tilt public opinion for or against a president or candidate and how it might be deployed.

Taiwan’s elections included a multi-faceted Beijing-led campaign using altered videos, fake audio files, fabricated voter polls, and memes alleging sexual harassment or illegitimate children. It targeted the former president and foreign minister, as well as the current president and vice-president when they were election candidates. This was all designed to sway voters towards Beijing’s preferred candidates—an effort that ultimately failed thanks to the resilience of Taiwan’s democracy, cross-sectoral rapid responses to debunk disinformation, and high voter sensitivity to the threat.

More recently, in late July, an incident emerged involving a fake video showing Philippines President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. allegedly taking illicit drugs. It appeared on the day he was due to deliver a state-of-the-union address. Although the clip was posted by a U.S. based Filipino activist, a network of PRC-linked accounts amplified and expanded its reach. Why? Presumably because Marcos Jr. has taken a stronger stance on PRC incursions in the South China Sea than his predecessor.

This is actually the second time a China-linked social media manipulation campaign has been found to target the Philippines and favor former president Rodrigo Duterte. It signals the potential of CCP-linked actors to amplify existing disinformation content—rather than create it—if it serves their desired aims, a more subtle approach than the full-on Taiwan model.

More likely: Amplifying polarization, targeting parliamentarians

Even if the CCP stays out of the presidential race, does this mean we will see no PRC-linked disinformation and manipulation campaigns in the United States ahead of November? No.

Based on research and investigations surrounding the 2020 and 2022 midterm U.S. elections, ongoing activity by PRC-linked fake accounts and social media influencers, and recent incidents in Taiwan, Canada, Australia, and Europe – it is almost certain that there will be some attempt made to meddle in the U.S. information environment and influence voters between now and November 5, and possibly in the election aftermath.

Rather than trying to turn voters towards or against a particular presidential candidate, it is likely to take two other forms:

1.    Amplifying existing political polarization, sowing distrust in U.S. democracy, and trying to influence policy debate on China-related issues.  

2.    Attempting to smear the reputation of non-presidential targets, including Congressional candidates critical of Beijing and Chinese dissidents.

For years now, academic research and tech firm reports have been unveiling coordinated campaigns by China-linked accounts and proxies to enhance divisions on social and political issues, impersonate U.S. voters, and even trigger real-world protests. Google’s quarterly Threat Analysis Group (TAG) reports have been replete with accounts of thousands of PRC-linked YouTube channels being taken down, some simply spam, others about “growing US political divisions” or “social issues in the US”. In early 2024, this included content that portrayed “US government, society, and democracy in a negative light.”

In February 2024, Meta reported a slew of fake accounts on Facebook pretending to be from U.S. military families and even launching a petition on a separate platform urging less U.S. support for Taiwan. In April, there were reports of fake persona accounts linked to China trying to informally poll real U.S. users on their views about various political issues, including election candidates, ostensibly to gauge public sentiment for future use.

Beyond such broad attempts to influence public opinion, there have been more targeted campaigns, ones that seek to mar the reputation of legislative candidates or even entire parliaments in the Asia-Pacific, Europe, and North America. In Taiwan, alongside the above-mentioned operation to sway the presidential race, reports emerged of troll attacks and disinformation targeting parliamentary candidates from the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) disfavored by Beijing. In one case, Ms. Li Ching-yi had her social media posts swamped with vulgar accusations and sexual overtones. False information also spread claiming that she had plagiarized her thesis.  It is hard to determine the impact of these attacks on voters, but ultimately she lost her seat in parliament. Indeed, the DPP lost its majority, though displeasure over the economy and social issues, as well as a third party gaining many seats—rather than PRC disinformation—is considered by experts to have contributed to that outcome.

In Europe, seven French MPs were the target of a phishing attack linked to China, while another French candidate in June’s European Parliament elections was warned that PRC-linked accounts were spreading claims he was a “Trojan Horse” for the United States and even a CIA agent.

In Canada, two sets of China-linked influence operations are worth noting. One targeted four MPs—three of Asian descent—using various tactics to harm their reputation and cut off access to constituents. These included coordinated attacks and false information spread about the candidate on WeChat, a social media platform owned by Chinese tech giant Tencent and used widely in the diaspora. They also involved offline pressure on Chinese community organizations not to invite disfavored candidates to events or urging ordinary voters not to volunteer with their campaigns.

In August-September 2023, another campaign in Canada combined social media posts on multiple platforms and AI-enhanced videos that made it appear that as if a prominent Chinese dissident was accusing Canadian politicians across the political spectrum of ethical and criminal violations, all the while making anti-Muslim comments. Although the attempt was exposed and debunked, it demonstrated the potential for PRC-linked operations to try to achieve dual goals at once: harm the reputation of Canadian lawmakers and of critics from among the Chinese diaspora. In Australia in early 2023, amid actual scandals emerging from misdeeds in parliamentary offices, China-linked accounts were found to be generating new, false information and circulating it to further undermine trust in the institution.

Implications for upcoming U.S. Congressional races

Several dimensions of these campaigns are notable when considering the implications for the U.S. political landscape and upcoming Congressional or local races. First, with the exception of Taiwan, all of these operations were party-agnostic. In other words, they were not trying to turn voters away from or towards a particular political party or segment of the domestic political spectrum.

Second, a common factor in who they did target were individual lawmakers known for being vocal critics of the Chinese government and its rights abuses. In several cases, those targeted by hacking or disinformation targeted are lawmakers who have been sanctioned by the PRC for their outspokenness or are known as members of entities like the Interparliamentary Alliance on China (IPAC). IPAC is a coalition of over 250 lawmakers from 40 countries who take joint action to support victims of Beijing’s repression or counter malign CCP influence targeting foreign countries.

From this perspective, there are a number of U.S. lawmakers—both Democrats and Republicans—who might be deemed ripe targets. IPAC itself includes eight U.S. Senators and Congresspeople in a bipartisan delegation. The Congressional-Executive Commission on China, which holds hearings and publishes an annual report on PRC rule of law violations, counts among its members nine representatives and nine senators from both parties. Twelve of those 18 members are running for re-election in November, as are five of the eight members of the U.S. IPAC delegation. A small number of U.S. lawmakers—including Congressman Jim McGovern (a Democrat from Massachusetts) and Senator Ted Cruz (a Republican from Texas)—have faced sanctions from the PRC in retaliation for their own or the U.S. government’s outspokenness on rights violations in China, including Hong Kong. Both are running this year.

Congressman Chris Smith, a Republican from New Jersey, co-chair of the CECC, and the sponsor of various pieces of legislation on human rights and religious freedom in China is also running and could be a tempting target for Beijing, but has also typically won a large proportion of votes in his district. Democrat Sherrod Brown, an articulate and outspoken critic of the CCP’s authoritarian rule in China and its implications for the United States, as well as a long-standing member and former co-chair of the CECC, could be more vulnerable given how tight a race he is facing in Ohio.

Let’s hope that the CCP and its proxies do not try to influence U.S. public opinion about these lawmakers or tilt these electoral contests. However, if recent events in elections around the world are any indication, their campaigns, relevant U.S. agencies, and major social media platforms should still keep their eyes peeled for PRC-linked mischief in the run-up to November.  

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What I’m reading

I’m always humbled by the amazing research on China and the CCP’s foreign influence that is being done by organizations, analysts, and thinktanks around the world. Each issue I hope to share with readers items I’ve come across, credible and important research about what is happening on the ground in China and elsewhere, but that may not have gotten much attention. Here are four that caught my eye this past month:

• China Dissent Monitor: This quarterly bulletin from Freedom House based on a massive database of incidents of protest and dissent from within China is an incredible resource. The latest issue—published on August 28 and covering April to June 2024—spotlights rural protests, driver dissatisfaction, and dissent related to the faltering property sector. The intersection between economic problems that make global headlines and grassroots protest (that often does not) is one of its most valuable contributions the CDM offers. For example, this issue notes that 2,820 of the protest incidents since June 2022—44 percent of all those in the database—relate to the property sector, cutting across 370 cities and every province. At least 26 percent have encountered government repression and after a dip in January 2024, there was been a steady rise in these protests through June. Having been involved in the early development of this project, it’s especially interesting to see how its findings unfold.

• Buddhist Association of China: In May, the International Campaign for Tibet published a detailed report on the often-overlooked Buddhist Association of China (BAC). Drawing especially on Chinese government documents, it details clearly the politicized nature of the CCP’s “Sinicization” campaign targeting Tibetan Buddhism. The report also outlines how BAC has evolved since 2018 when it was brought directly under the CCP’s United Front Work Department (UFWD) and lists by name many of its key figures dealing with Tibetan Buddhism, including ethnic Tibetans. It’s crucial for any international interlocutors—including those who may attend the World Buddhist Forum in Ningbo in October—to understand the BAC’s subordinate relationship with the UFWD and the fact that this is not an independent association or religious community.

• Weaponizing Social Media: As you can see from the opening article, doing a deep dive into reports on CCP foreign-facing disinformation campaigns and tactics is a pastime of mine. This one from the Falun Dafa Information Center, published in early August, is notable for the insights it offers—based on leaked sources within the Chinese party-state—on how these campaigns evolve, how proxies like social media influencers are used, and which parts of the regime’s bureaucracy participate. It also offers disturbing details of an emerging, targeted, and multi-pronged campaign by the CCP on the global community of people who practice Falun Gong, the spiritual and meditation practice brutally persecuted in China.

• China Indonesia Provincial Index: This new report is the result of a massive undertaking to assess and compare CCP influence in 38 provinces in Indonesia, laying out in detail variations across the country. Based largely on the China Index methodology developed by the Taiwan-based DoubleThink Labs, a team of Indonesian researchers assessed CCP influence across eight sectors: Academia, Media, Foreign Policy, Economy, Local Politics, Society, Law Enforcement, and Technology. The findings, published by the local thinktank CELIOS (Center of Economic and Law Studies) represent one of the most comprehensive and nuanced examples I’ve seen to date on how CCP influence plays out at a subnational level.

Prisoner to Remember

China is arguably home to the largest population of prisoners of conscience in the world—people jailed simply for who they are, what they said, or what they believe. They reasonably number in the hundreds of thousands, even millions, though a full list of every prisoner is unavailable. These innocent men and women are held in prisons, detention centers, police stations, forced conversion facilities, psychiatric hospitals, and a variety of extralegal locations. Many simply disappear. Each issue I hope to highlight at least one prisoner, a modest attempt to remind the outside world of their existence and suffering.

Gao Zhisheng

August 13 marked the seventh anniversary since Gao Zhisheng—a courageous and pioneering human rights lawyer—disappeared. His wife, now living in the United States, continues to plead with the Chinese government to simply “tell me whether he is still alive or not.” The regime has not shared any information on his whereabouts or fate. Gao rose up from poverty to become one of China’s most prominent lawyers and a leader of the country’s fledgling human rights defense movement in the early and mid-2000s, inspiring a generation of other attorneys to take up cases related to village corruption, religious persecution, and internet censorship.

I first came across Gao’s work as head of the Amnesty International society in grad school, then had the honor of being part of team that edited a memoir and collection of Gao’s writings published in 2006, which is still available on Amazon. The fact that a civil society leader like Gao has been imprisoned so many times, tortured, and even presumably killed is a tragedy not only for him and his family, but also for the prospect of a future freer and more just Chinese society. The Chinese government should come clean and explain what has happened to him.