Advice to BlueSky: Be Ready for PRC (or Other) Influence Operations
Amid a surge of new users, the app should prepare now for future manipulation attempts
After taking a break over the Thanksgiving holiday, today’s edition of UnderReported China covers: risks BlueSky might face from China-linked influence operations if its popularity continues to rise, new research on Chinese Communist Party (CCP) influence in Europe and Canada, and the latest case of a Chinese journalist being sentenced to prison.
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Clouds to Watch For in BlueSky
Though launched in 2019, over the past month the social media app BlueSky has skyrocketed in the size of its user base, as millions of people have signed up seeking an alternative to X. The number of users surpassed 24 million by the end of November and continues to climb. I too joined the platform recently and have been relatively impressed with the quality of information sharing on China and the growing contingent of serious China watchers and journalists on the app. (It has also nice to be able to share links to Substack posts link this one without their being buried in followers’ feeds.)
Such rapid growth for an app that reportedly has only 20 full-time staff poses both challenges and opportunities. As BlueSky grows in influence and dynamism with this influx, its executives should also be on the lookout for less savory actors. Recent history has shown that where the users flow, influence operations and propaganda campaigns—including those driven by authoritarian states like China and Russia—follow. One of the key trends in PRC-linked disinformation campaigns since 2020 has been their proliferation and coordination across multiple platforms.
At a structural level BlueSky appears to have some advantages over competitors in terms of built-in resilience, notably the control given to users to adjust what feeds they see and which moderation policies apply to the content they view. As one commentator recently noted, “BlueSky’s simplicity may yet be its best protection for its purity.” But Chinese party-state actors and accounts have shown time and again a determination to circumvent measures enacted by platforms to curb inauthentic behavior.
On the propaganda side, a quick search of BlueSky demonstrates that at least some Chinese state media and foreign ministry spokespeople have already joined. Their level of activity varies and the follower numbers dwarf those on X or Facebook, but if the app continues to gain traction around the world, the regime may start investing more in building an audience.
If BlueSky truly wishes to establish itself as a haven for quality information-sharing and public debate, it should take steps now to prepare for future manipulation campaigns.
This is all the more reason why BlueSky should start now to implement policies that have been effective elsewhere in detecting, curbing, and informing users of influence efforts from Chinese or other state-linked entities. The following four would be a good place to begin:
Strategize in advance on how to respond to bad behavior: Reflecting on well-documented examples from other social networks—especially Twitter/X—there are a few scenarios that seem reasonable to expect on BlueSky. These include networks of fake accounts amplifying Chinese diplomats’ posts, PRC-linked actors impersonating Chinese dissidents or U.S. voters to sow discord or smear reputations, and Chinese officials using accounts to intimidate foreign journalists or commentators. If BlueSky’s user base continues to expand, including among those interested in China, similar dynamics could appear and the app will be better placed to respond effectively if it isn’t caught flat-footed.
Label state-linked accounts: Google’s YouTube was one of the first to implement this policy, followed later by Facebook and Twitter. The purpose is to provide transparency to users that the account they are interacting with is linked to a government, democratic or otherwise. Given the efforts of Chinese state media and other PRC-linked accounts to obfuscate these ties—largely because global audiences are rightfully skeptical of CCP propaganda—the labeling provides an important notification to users. A 2021 study by the China Media Project found that after Twitter added labels, engagement with Chinese state media accounts dropped by 10-31 percent, depending on the account. Unfortunately, in April 2023, Twitter (now X) ended that policy, allowing the outlets freer rein on the platform.
As some Chinese state outlets open accounts on BlueSky, the network should implement its own labeling policy. Deceptive taglines by Chinese state media accounts are already evident. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) mouthpiece People’s Daily bills itself as “the largest newspaper in China” without mentioning its party ties; the state-owned China Daily simply cites itself as a source of “Breaking news;” and China Global Television Network (CGTN) says it “aims to provide global audiences with accurate and timely news coverage as well as rich audiovisual services,” again with no mention of being the international arm of the Chinese state broadcaster China Central Television (CCTV). Thus far, each of these accounts have fewer than 1,000 followers but the self-descriptions match those on other platforms with larger followings.
Establish a team to detect and disrupt inauthentic activity: It is only a matter of time before state-linked—or other malign—actors start creating fake accounts and trying to manipulate their way into users’ feeds with all form of propaganda, disinformation, cyberbullying, or divisive content. If BlueSky does not already have a team with the relevant expertise to detect such activity, it should establish one or in the interim, collaborate with cybersecurity firms like Graphika or Recorded Future to assist in monitoring the social network; its open API may allow for such analysis by external researchers regardless and hopefully some are keeping an eye out.
Publish periodic transparency reports on influence operations: Should influence operations and networks of fake accounts begin making appearances on BlueSky, exposing and sharing that information with the public, policymakers, and other social media platforms is essential to curbing their impact and enhancing the overall resilience of the information space. The company should incorporate a section on influence operations into annual or quarterly transparency reports, even if they are absent, if only to reassure users and policymakers that this is not occurring.
Once they appear—an almost certain eventuality if the app continues to grow in popularity—the firm should publicize details such as the size of inauthentic networks, the content focus, key samples of content posted, and as much as possible, attribution to the state or other actor from which the operation is believed to have originated. Similar reports published regularly by Google, Meta, and Microsoft have become important sources of information for researchers, policymakers, and tech firms on emerging threats and tactics, as well as a resource for news outlets whose reporting on take-downs reach a wider audience, enhancing public awareness.
It has been seven years since China-linked disinformation operations were first detected on foreign social media platforms. One clear pattern that has emerged is how the various actors within the regime’s apparatus that partake in these efforts are as nimble as they are determined, identifying loopholes, experimenting, and adapting to amplify their effectiveness—whether the goal is to smear a critic’s reputation, artificially boost the perceived popularity of a Chinese state accounts’ posts, or sow discord in a foreign democracy.
If BlueSky truly wishes to establish itself as a haven for quality information-sharing and public debate, it should take steps now to prepare.
What I’m Reading: New research on CCP political influence in the Netherlands, Canada, and Bulgaria
The Netherlands: Researchers from the European-based China Knowledge Network published a report in October on “Chinese influence and interference in the Dutch media landscape.” The comprehensive study examines restrictions and threats on Dutch correspondents in China, influence and harassment in the Netherlands, and conditions for members of the Chinese, Uighur, and Tibetan diaspora. For those familiar with the CCP’s tactics, the findings reflect what one might expect—serious challenges for China-based correspondents and as the authors note, “subtle” but impactful influence and interference in the media landscape in the Netherlands itself.
Still, it is always striking to be reminded of the sheer scale of resources that Beijing invests even in relatively small countries and languages spoken by several million people. The researchers’ articulation of the psychological ramifications of the CCP’s tactics and their ultimate impact are insightful, as are the findings that editors and newsrooms are ill-equipped to respond—or even at times to recognize—the subtle influence tactics employed by the Chinese regime.
Canada: On November 14, the organization Digital Public Square and the Munk School in Canada published the findings of a nationwide public opinion survey on foreign interference from the PRC in the country. The survey questions covered a wide range of topics, but a few responses were particularly notable. Some 62 percent of respondents view foreign interference as a serious problem in Canada.
Moreover, when it comes to transnational repression targeting members of the Chinese, Taiwanese, Uyghur, or Tibetan diaspora, 14 percent (1 in 7) of respondents from those communities reported directly experiencing or knowing a family or friend who had experienced political intimidation, harassment, or covert threats from the Chinese government. That figure alone speaks to the scale of the challenge. The report is part of a larger project that hopefully will help make inroads in addressing this issue and enhancing Canada’s resilience, including protections for these targeted communities.
Bulgaria: In another study focused on a small European country, last week, the consortium China Observers in Central and Eastern Europe (CHOICE) published an analysis of PRC influence in Bulgaria. Though not as extensive as the above two reports, this is the first such research I’ve seen focused on this European Union member. As in the Dutch case above, the author highlights the subtle and relatively low-key nature of China’s presence in the country, while outlining “a growing network of joint initiatives—spanning business, academic, and media exchanges—along with a community of local facilitators of Chinese influence.”
That network is “laying the groundwork for expanding bilateral engagement,” but also potential leverage for more concerted political influence, especially given the limited awareness of the risk among the country’s political elite. A few areas of vulnerability that stood out to me are the role that domestic political instability plays in weakening resilience, the limited in-country awareness of financial losses from past Chinese investments, and a major newspaper regularly republishing content from the state-run China Radio International.
Prisoner to remember: Chinese Journalist Dong Yuyu
On November 29, a Beijing court sentenced Dong Yuyu to seven years in prison on charges of espionage for meeting with Japanese diplomats. Dong, a commentator and editor at the state-owned Guangming Daily, was detained in February 2022, shortly before he was due to retire. I wrote about his case in May 2023 as part of Freedom House’s China Media Bulletin:
Dong, a savvy observer of China’s international relations, was widely known and respected among foreign journalists and diplomats. Sensing the regime’s growing sensitivity to such interactions, he had become more circumspect in his writings and careful in his meetings with foreigners, but his precautions were apparently insufficient. He was detained three months before retiring, and his family did not initially publicize his arrest, hoping the charges would be dismissed because his contacts with foreign representatives were a routine part of his job.
Though not unexpected, it’s still sad to hear of his long sentence more than two years after his initial arrest. Dong’s cases epitomizes the shifting “red lines” under Xi Jinping, where previously permissible—and at times, encouraged—activities suddenly become sensitive and even criminalized. His imprisonment comes on the heels of lawyer Yu Wensheng and his wife Xu Yan being detained en route to meet with European diplomats and then being sentenced to prison in October for “inciting subversion of state power.”
These cases highlight the regime’s increased aggressiveness at restricting foreign diplomats in China from simply meeting and speaking with Chinese citizens who might offer an alternative perspective from the official party line. Dong’s detention and now sentencing under the espionage law are chilling also for the business community, as foreign firms have been subjected to raids and audits under the same legislation.
Really great points, particularly on publishing periodic transparency report on PRC information operations. As Bluesky grows in popularity, this could inform the public and government officials on the type of information campaigns that the PRC is undertaking on the platform.
I just tried to post this article to Bluesky. Received error "Internal Server Error". Shadow banned for just trying to share? Wow...