PRC Disinformation and U.S. elections (Part III): Updates on Emerging Tactics

Short-form videos, user engagement, fake websites, and U.S. government responses

I had been hoping to publish a longer, analytical post this week on how the CCP’s offline influence factors into online content, but am still working on it. In the meantime, there have been several new reports published recently that touch on this topic and add new insights to my previous two posts.

So, for today, I decided to focus on those, highlighting findings that show emerging PRC tactics or U.S. government actions to enhance resilience and education.

New research on PRC-linked disinformation tactics and narratives

The following are three sets of research findings published this past month that struck me as notable.

1. Microsoft cites shift to shortform videos, rapid response, and interactive user engagement

On September 17, the U.S. tech firm Microsoft published its latest report on foreign influence operations targeting the United States, sharing findings related to Iran, Russia, and China. On China, it noted that the PRC-linked influence actor Storm-1852 had “pivoted to shortform video content” before being disrupted.

Notably, the network’s personas were found to respond remarkably quickly and nimbly to political events, even compared to other China-linked actors. The Storm-1852 accounts tried to cultivate an audience through more hands-on and interactive approaches like replying to comments and live reposting of content from real users and commentators about breaking news events. One example cited was a rapid reaction to the July assassination attempt on Donald Trump, where accounts released an original shortform video within hours and amplified content that falsely claimed Democrats’ involvement.

Microsoft’s Vice Chair and President Brad Smith was also among three tech executives who testified on September 18 before the Senate Intelligence Committee on threats to U.S. elections, artificial intelligence (AI), and the role of technology companies. In his opening statement, Smith similarly highlighted how China-linked personas have been implementing “more tailored audience engagement” than previously, noting tactics like “tagging politicians and political commentators, and creating online groups with likeminded voters.” He too noted the shift from infographics and memes that had “largely failed to resonate with U.S. voters” to shortform videos edited from mainstream news media, some of which garnered hundreds of thousands of views.

2. Voice of America (VOA) and DoubleThinkLabs

The U.S.-funded broadcaster and Taiwan-based NGO specializing in disinformation detection have apparently teamed up to monitor potential China-linked networks and interference, with a focus on 201 specific accounts on the X platform. A September 28 article published by VOA outlines their latest findings. These include previously identified tactics such as intensifying social divisions but also imitating U.S. voters, especially supporters of former President Donald Trump. Still, a few specific details stood out as worth highlighting:

• Role of “seed” versus “amplifying” accounts: The article cites several examples of specific accounts in the network that appear to serve as content producers versus others that primarily amplify posts by those “seed” accounts. For example, two posts about the Israel-Gaza conflict and Intel layoffs were amplified by 40 and 36 accounts, respectively, all from the same network.

• Evidence of down ballot targeting: As I wrote in my August 31 post, it seems more likely that PRC-linked operations will target candidates running for Congress than try to tilt the outcome of the presidential election, with such efforts being party agnostic. VOA and Doublethink report having found two such examples—a TikTok video criticizing Republican Senator Josh Hawley and another ridiculing Democratic Representative Jerry Nadler. Both lawmakers are up for re-election and while these may not indicate full-fledged campaigns to undermine their reputation, it clearly signals that this is indeed a space to watch.

• Spread of antisemitic narratives: VOA reporter and Substacker Wenhao Ma published additional findings from the monitoring effort on October 5. His post highlighted the presence of antisemitic narratives among the content being shared and amplified by three “seed” PRC-linked accounts targeting the United States (which are then amplified by another 140). The posts identified seem to be especially focused on interpreting the fact that several top officials in the Biden administration or related to former presidents are of Jewish descent as a conspiracy to control Washington—while also falsely attributing Jewish heritage to other individuals. As Wenhao notes, “Similar antisemitic narratives about U.S. politics posted by the spamouflage accounts have long been flourishing on the Chinese internet.”

3.     Researcher Shannon van Sant in the Jamestown China Brief

In an article published on September 6, Shannon van Sant offers a detailed analysis of the news website Beijing Times, highlighting several questionable dimensions and raising convincing concerns that it is in-fact some kind of CCP proxy. Her findings include the fact that the paper’s coverage of topics sensitive to Beijing closely aligns with the regime’s positions and terminology and that some of its reporters have no other online presence, while their photos appear to be AI-generated. Notably, despite this murkiness, van Sant found multiple examples of mainstream U.S. outlets citing Beijing Times’ articles and amplifying its content on topics ranging from new Chinese military technology to China’s influence on the Pacific Islands. Adding to the outlets’ perceived credibility is the fact that Beijing-aligned articles are “sandwiched between neutral and informative articles” and the formatting mimics prominent outlets like the New York Times or Politico. It’s worth noting that after the article was published, the Beijing Times denied any ties to the Chinese government but also announced it was ending coverage of political topics.

U.S. government responses

On the other side of the equation, it’s encouraging to see greater attention being paid to the potential risks surrounding CCP influence operations targeting the United States, be it online or offline. Besides the September 18 Senate Intelligence hearing mentioned above, two documents published by U.S. agencies in September are worth checking if you, like me, sometimes have trouble tracking who in the U.S. government is responsible for monitoring and responding to foreign influence and disinformation campaigns from the CCP or other adversaries.

• Government Accountability Office (GAO): On September 26, the GAO published the first of two reports focused on foreign disinformation targeting the United States. This installment provides a short overview of China, Russia, and Iran’s efforts and then outlines in detail key definitions and roles of U.S. agencies handling this challenge.

• Department of Homeland Security briefing paper on tools of PRC influence with a focus on subnational tactics: Also published last month, this document is 77 pages long, but offers one of the most detailed articulations by a U.S. government agency of CCP foreign influence strategies and tactics that I’ve seen, especially with regard to subnational influence. It was published as an open-source resource for local officials, among others, who might face some of these influence efforts. If read (despite its length) it could go a long way towards increasing resilience and helping local officials be more cognizant of how seemingly harmless invitations or offers may not be so innocuous. This is the type of action I’ve heard recommended by witnesses at several Congressional hearings in recent years and whether that was the catalyst or not, it’s nice to see this being implemented.

  

  Cover of September 2024 brief by the Department of Homeland Security on PRC tactics for foreign influence, especially at the subnational level

Closing thought

Although I focus primarily on China, going through these latest reports, I couldn’t help but read up on the election influence efforts apparently being made by Russia and Iran. From that perspective, it is striking that these three regimes actually appear to have very different goals and preferences. Microsoft’s Brad Smith noted this dynamic in his Senate testimony:

Today, we see Iran, Russia, and China using cyber operations to target the U.S. election in November. Iranian operations have targeted candidates of both parties but are inclined to denigrate former President Trump’s campaign, which indicates a preference for a Harris victory. Russian operations, meanwhile, are inclined to denigrate Vice President Harris’s campaign, indicating a preference for a Trump victory. China, for its part, has aimed to collect intelligence and to stoke discord, while to date not showing a clear preference for a specific candidate.

For what it’s worth, if the United States is going to have three foreign adversaries trying to influence voters, it’s probably a good thing that they are all rowing in different directions.